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s politics go in Moldova, a month is not a very long period. Yet, in the weeks that 
have passed since the November 30th Parliamentary elections, precious time has been 
lost for a country that can ill afford the passing days and weeks without a new 
government. The laborious negotiations for the formation of a new government seem to be 
afflicted with the same illness that characterised the outgoing coalition government – 
internal rivalries driven by personality disputes rather than serious policy issues.  
While the political leaders are dithering, the country’s economic woes are crying out for 
attention. 
At the same time, the country is caught in the middle of a much larger geopolitical struggle 
between Russia and the EU. This struggle is reflected in different ways, not least in the 
ongoing negotiations to resolve the dispute with Transdniestria which are going nowhere, 
with only two out of the scheduled five rounds of negotiations of the 5+2 process1 having 
taken place during the past year. Russia’s influence is also making itself felt in the 
autonomous region of Gagauzia, where it has openly supported the pro-Russian and 
Eurasian Union sentiments there.  
A prolonged government vacuum in Moldova will thus only add to the atmosphere of 
uncertainty and insecurity for the future of the country. 
Coalition-building 
The pro-European parties that formed part of the outgoing coalition government (Liberal 
Democrat, Democrat and Liberal) were returned in the November elections with a very slim 
majority, gaining just over 45% of the votes, giving them a combined total number of 54 seats 
in the 101 seat Parliament. They have announced their intention to form a new government. 
On the other hand, the Communist Party led by its long-standing leader Vladimir Voronin 
and the openly pro-Russian Party of the Radical Left, received a combined total of almost 
40% giving them 44 seats. Admittedly this is not a united opposition front, with Voronin 
having pursued an independent line from Moscow during much of his leadership. But with 
                                                   
1 Officially called Permanent Conference for Political Questions in the Framework of the Negotiating 
Process for the Transdniestrian Settlement, but commonly referred to as the 5+2 process, which 
includes the two sides – Moldova and Transdniestria, Russia, Ukraine and the OSCE as mediators, 
with the latter acting as chair, and the EU and US as observers. 
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the country deeply divided between the various political parties offering dramatically 
different policy options for the country’s future, whichever new coalition government 
emerges will need all the time and resources at its disposal to convince the electorate that it 
has not only the capacity but also the will power to push through the reforms that the 
country desperately needs.  
Despite crude attempts by Russia to intimidate the previous coalition with its embargo 
during 2013 of Moldovan wine and other products, the Moldovan government remained 
steadfast in its determination to pursue its European integration aspirations by signing the 
Association Agreement as well as the Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Agreement 
(DCFTA). It was also granted visa-free travel to the EU, after successfully implementing the 
necessary reforms. These tangible benefits for the citizens of Moldova were a clear 
demonstration of the advantages of the country pursuing its European dream. The EU has 
meanwhile promised much-needed aid for the country to help it achieve a more successful 
record in the fight against corruption and the other reforms vital for the country’s future.  
The positive momentum achieved last year should be put to the best advantage by the new 
government. But the longer the political parties delay in agreeing on a new coalition 
government, the more they are playing into the hands of Russia, which will do everything in 
its power to prevent the country from pursuing its European integration aspirations. 
Once in place, a new coalition government will thus have no time to lose. Two priorities in 
particular should stand out in the new government’s programme. 
Internal reforms 
First of all, the new government should set out a bold and ambitious programme of internal 
reforms aimed at ending once and for all the endemic cronyism and corruption that has 
stifled economic development and deterred much-needed foreign investment. The 
Association Agreement signed with the EU sets out very clearly what is required. The first 
priority should be to implement judicial reform and set up effective mechanisms in the fight 
against corruption. The EU-Moldova Association Council set up under the Association 
Agreement, scheduled to meet in the coming weeks, will be an opportunity to reiterate the 
key priorities, as well as to confirm the EU’s financial support and technical expertise in the 
various sectors identified so as to ensure effective implementation of the adopted reforms. 
Solving Transdniestria 
Secondly, the new government should set out a clear vision for resolving the long-standing 
protracted conflict with Transdniestria. For too long, the government has prevaricated in 
articulating a comprehensive strategy to achieve a final settlement. All participants in the 
negotiating process are on record as agreeing on what should be the final goal: incorporation 
of Transdniestria with a special status into the territorial integrity of Moldova. Russia of 
course has its own vision of what this ‘special status’ should be. This was set out in the so-
called Kozak Memorandum2 presented in 2003, which proposed a federalised structure for 
Moldova, giving Russia undue influence and allowing it to maintain a military presence 
until 2020. It was rejected by the then Moldovan Prime Minister Voronin who emphasised 
that it would violate Moldova’s neutral status as defined in its constitution. Nevertheless, 
Russia continues to trot out the Kozak option at every opportunity, even though it is fully 
aware that the Russian notion of federalism is like waving a red rag in front of a bull, 
                                                   
2 Named after the Russian politician and senior aide to President Putin who drew up the 
memorandum. 
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whether in the context of Ukraine or Moldova, as it would result in undue Russian control 
and undermine the sovereignty of both Ukraine and Moldova.  
There are other constitutional options that could help in achieving a final settlement while 
preserving Moldova’s neutral status and avoiding the ‘f’ word. The Irish Chairmanship of 
the OSCE, which presided over the 5+2 negotiations during 2012, put forward a framework 
document entitled “Food for Thought” which set out a proposed road map for a final 
settlement. The document was inspired by the Northern Ireland peace process where a 
similar procedure was used based on the principle “nothing is agreed until everything is 
agreed”, and which played a critical role in reaching the 1998 Good Friday Agreement. The 
Irish Chairmanship document remains on the table of the participants in the 5+2 process. It is 
time it was revisited. 
If 2014 is anything to go by, Russia will be in no mood to allow the Transdniestrian 
settlement process to move forward. Yet, with Russia’s economy facing a continued 
downward spiral, Transdniestria offers President Putin an opportunity to appear 
constructive without losing face. It would have everything to win and nothing to lose. There 
is no danger of a NATO membership, since the Moldovan leadership has repeated its desire 
to maintain the country’s neutral status. It would be an opportunity to show that 
maintaining Russian influence does not necessarily mean dictating to its neighbours but 
rather promoting a constructive dialogue and cooperation.  
Another reason for Moldova to move forward on the Transdniestrian issue is linked to the 
DCFTA. Although the current Transdniestrian leadership refused to be part of the DCFTA, 
the region continues to enjoy an autonomous trade preference regime granted by the EU, 
which absorbs some 70% of Transdniestrian products. This regime will expire on 1 January 
2016. Thus, Moldova has one year in which to convince Transdniestria that its best interests 
lie in being part of the DCFTA. Failure will mean that Transdniestrian products will 
automatically be subject to prohibitive tariffs, further complicating efforts to find a lasting 
settlement.  
Conclusion 
So all in all, the new government in Moldova, once established, faces a challenging year 
ahead, but judging from what was achieved in the past year against all odds, it is doable. 
However, it is only possible if a government is put in place without further delay. If it 
promotes a policy of consensus-building across the country, while involving civil society 
representatives and the business community, including from Transdniestria, it can move 
forward on a sound basis. 
